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Abstract
Particularism refers to the idea that different moral standards apply to different people. 
This view is inherently discriminatory.  The universal application of moral principles has
been challenged in 'communitarian' critiques, which argue that moral rules have to be
placed in a specific social context.  People are tied to families, communities and localities;
these kinds of relationships define the scope of their moral responsibilities.  There are
strong particularist traditions in Europe, including arguments for 'sphere sovereignty' and
'solidarity'.  Some ideals in social policy, including the 'welfare society' and the concept of
'welfare pluralism', appeal to similar social constructs, and are likely to be particularist in
their effects. 
Particularism can be qualified by the acceptance of some basic universal principles, but
this still implies a presumption in favour of certain discriminatory structures.  The
arguments for particularism are framed in very similar terms to those which socialists
use, referring to social networks, mutual aid and collective action.  Ideas like
empowerment, or participation in social networks, are generally applied within a
particularist framework.  For universalists, the main danger in advocating 'community'
and 'solidarity' as values in their own right is that they are liable to be discriminatory in
practice.  Communitarianism is an attractive approach; it is also dangerous.  
Universalism and particularism
The kinds of moral beliefs and principles which are usually referred to in social policy are
universal: they apply to everyone, or at least to everyone who falls within relevant
criteria.  In social policy, 'universalism' is often taken in a narrow but 'thick' sense - that is,
a highly specific but elaborate use of the term - referring to a way of distributing benefits
and services.  'Universality' is commonly distinguished from 'selectivity': if universal
benefits are available to everyone, selective benefits are available only to those in need. 
The distinction of universality and selectivity is mainly about method; where it touches on
principles, it is usually another way of referring to models of 'institutional and 'residual'
welfare (Spicker, 1988, pp 162-4).  But there is also a 'thinner', broader use of the idea of
universality, found in expressions like 'universal human rights'; that is the sense in which I
shall be using the term here.  If universalism means that the same rules are applied to
everyone, residual and institutional models might both be called 'universal' in the 'thin'
sense of the word.  
Universalist premises of this kind pervade much of the discussion of welfare: concepts
like altruism, freedom, or the 'right to welfare' are applied in general terms, and it is
usually taken for granted that they should be - I have to confess to doing it myself
(Spicker, 1988).  Fiona Williams' critique of universalism offers an interesting example,
because on the face of it she is concerned with issues of diversity and difference.  She
argues as follows:
The distrust of uniformity and universalism and the recognition of diversity and
difference has emerged in two ways within social policy.  The first has been a 'top
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down' approach to diversity in the form of welfare pluralism.  The second has
been a 'bottom up' development of work around gender in particular, but also
race, disability, age and sexuality.  One consequence of this latter work has been
to expose the 'false universalism' of the post war welfare state ... Whilst welfare
pluralism stresses the diversity of sources ... for welfare provision, the second
places emphasis on the diversity of identity, experience, interest and need in
welfare provision. (Williams, 1992, pp 206-7)
This is not an argument against the universal application of principles; rather, it implies
that the traditional interpretation of 'universalism' has not been universal enough.  
Critical theory, as outlined by Habermas, has to take a view from outside the society
which is being criticised.  It depends on a communicative discourse referring to consistent
criteria; as such, it is built on universalist premises.  Habermas proposes a 'fundamental
principle of universalisation', that 'every valid norm must be able to be accepted by all
those affected.' (cited Kelly, 1990, p.147.)   The universal application of moral norms -
applying them to everyone - is based in an argument from consistency: if one accepts a
rule in one case, it cannot reasonably be denied in other circumstances which satisfy the
same criteria (Habermas, 1990, pp 68-70).  The same principle establishes a presumptive
case for equality and social justice: people should be treated equally when other things
are equal, and unequally only if they are not (Spicker, 1985).  This kind of argument has
been taken to be so obvious in the discussion of social policy that the issue of universal
application has  hardly been discussed.  In other areas of academic discourse, however,
universalist premises have been seriously challenged.  The counter argument to
Habermas is represented, in different ways, by a range of 'communitarian' arguments. 
Communitarians argue that the values and norms on which a social critique can be
founded must be drawn from specific social contexts.  An asocial critique has no meaning
(see Rasmussen, 1990).  Communitarianism can be taken to stand for a highly socialised
view of people in which their moral position can be understood only in terms of their
social relationships.   Communitarian critiques challenge the basis on which judgments
about society can be made, and they imply that different standards will be applied in
different places.  
The debate between universalism and communitarianism cuts across the conventional
division of 'left' and 'right' wing; there are left- and right-wing communitarians, as there
are left- and right-wing universalists.  On the left, communitarian critiques have mainly
been directed at the kind of abstract moral theory associated with writers like Rawls or
Nozick, and in particular at liberalism (Kymlicka, 1989).  Part of the critique of the welfare
state with which Williams is concerned has been communitarian rather than universalist:
welfare, to be effective, must both recognize the limitations and build on the strengths of
existing social relationships.  On the right, communitarian premises have been used to
challenge some of the general principles, like equality and social justice (see, e.g. Charvet,
1983), which have been basic to socialism in the past.  The conservative critique has been
a powerful one, because it uses the same kind of language and premises as collectivism -
a concern with mutual support, diversity, social networks and social context - to argue for
social differentiation.  It is an argument that communitarian socialists need to come to
terms with.  This paper has two main aims.  One is to explain the arguments for
particularism and communitarianism; the second is to try to reconcile them with the
universal values on which socialism depends.
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At the simplest level, communitarian ideas imply that there are differences between
people, and that these differences must lead to diverse responses.  MacIntyre, for
example, writes that
'we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity.  I
am someone's son or daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of
this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan,
that tribe, this nation.  Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who
inhabits these roles.' (MacIntyre, 1981, pp 204-205).
MacIntyre has also argued that norms have to be understood in the context of particular
traditions (1988) - and so that they have to be different.  Some communitarian thinkers
take this much further.  Walzer, in 'Spheres of justice', argues that social principles like
justice, equality and need can only be understood and implemented in specific social
contexts: his case is 
'that the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different
social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with
different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive
from different understandings of the actual goods themselves - the inevitable
product of historical and cultural particularism.'  (Walzer, 1983, p.6) 
'Particularism', rather than communitarianism, is the true opposite of universalism; it
refers to the idea that different standards should be applied to different people (Jones,
1990).   The kinds of standards which this argues for are discriminatory.  Walzer, for
example, is ready to argue for the restriction of immigration, and within that for priority
to the relatives of existing citizens.  Discrimination is often morally objectionable, and
much of it is better explained in terms like 'prejudice' (Allport, 1954) rather than in any
moral sense.  But discrimination is not necessarily random, irrational or indefensible; it is
based on criteria like kinship, friendship, community and nationality. The kinds of
responsibilities which people recognise to each other are not universal; they depend on
existing ties.  The corollary is that people who do not share those ties are left out, and are
liable as a result to receive less.  The effect of giving priority to family, community or
occupational group is to exclude outsiders - people without roots, people from different
communities, and those with marginal status - people who are often poor and
disadvantaged.  So, for example, an appeal for extra resources for Scotland is generally
made at the expense of other areas; and where the sons and daughters of council
tenants are given priority for rehousing (Kensington and Chelsea has a formal scheme),
the people who get left out include incomers, and racial minorities.    
It is tempting to dismiss this kind of discrimination as immoral, because much of it is.  But
it hardly seems reasonable to treat all forms of discrimination in the same way: if there is
a moral defect in giving preferential treatment to one's family, arguing for resources for
one's home town or region, or special pleading for one disadvantaged group out of many,
it hardly seems to fall in the same category as, say, refusing health care to people on
racial grounds.  That is not to say that there is no connection between this kind of
discrimination and disadvantage.  If everyone gives preference to their family, then richer
families will thrive, and the disadvantage of poor families will be reinforced; if too much
is made of community affiliations, ethnic minorities will be excluded; and special
treatment for one disadvantaged group is all too often gained at the expense of others. 
But the position is not simply a moral aberration, which we might choose to tolerate
because it is 'understandable'.  Particularism represents a set of moral imperatives in its
own right.  
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Universalists have acknowledged the arguments half-heartedly.  Titmuss was concerned
to establish the importance of social integration, as well as universal social provision
(though he couched the arguments for a 'gift relationship' in universalist terms) (Titmuss,
1970).  The recognition of duties at the personal level, duties which usually far exceed
those required from universal principles like human rights or altruism, is fundamental to
much moral conduct.  The moral obligations experienced within the family are the
archetypal example.  Conversely, I suspect we would feel that there was something
morally wrong with someone whose commitment for the third world was so great that he
or she subordinated all responsibility to family, friends and community.  Where there is a
tension between the two principles, it is not necessarily the case that universalism should
be preferred.
Particularist beliefs
The universalist ethos has been so much accepted in the academic literature in Britain
that it is difficult to find explicit arguments for a particularist approach.   Particularism,
however, derives from long-standing traditions; it is possible to see, in the growth of
communitarianism, references to ancient arguments.  Walzer's arguments are influenced
both by American pluralism and traditional Judaism.  The pluralist tradition in the United
States has emphasised community solidarity and diversity.  The Jewish tradition is
strongly communitarian: according to Jewish law, charity is to be distributed to one's
poor relatives before strangers; to Jewish poor before non-Jewish poor (there are also
reservations against taking charity from non-Jews); and to the poor of one's own town
before the poor of any other town (Encyclopaedica Judaica, 1971).  The role of
'communitarianism' might be seen as a justification of the kinds of particularist
arguments which have long been prevalent in many different societies.
Perhaps the nearest thing to a defence of discriminatory approaches in English writing is
found in traditional conservatism.  Conservatism has often represented society as a
complex, organic structure in which people develop a range of responsibilities of different
kinds and at different levels.  People are born into families, communities, and nations
(Clarke, 1975).  But there are more fully developed arguments.  In European thought, the
most important arguments of this kind have been the development, associated
respectively with Calvinist and Catholic social thought, of 'sphere sovereignty' and
'solidarity'.  
Sphere sovereignty
The idea of sphere sovereignty comes from the Netherlands.  It was developed by Groen
van Prinsterer, on a prescriptive basis, as a defence of the kinds of social networks which
had developed in practice (Dooyeweerd, 1979, pp 53-54).  Kuyper, the leader of the
Christian Anti-Revolutionary Party, was to justify the principle in theological terms.  He
claimed that social diversity reflected the kinds of differences intended by God as part of
the creation, and that the duty of the state was to safeguard such boundaries.  Kuyper
argued that the development of social relationships "is spontaneous, just as that of the
stem and branches of a plant" (1899, p.117).  The spheres had developed naturally: "all
together they form the life of creation, in accord with the ordinances of creation, and
therefore are organically developed."  (p.118) 
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The concept of sphere sovereignty was liberal in its origins.  The idea was used to deny
state authority in important areas of people's lives, like the family, education and
religion.  "In a Calvinistic sense", Kuyper wrote, 
"we understand hereby, that the family, the business, science, art and so forth are
all social spheres, which do not owe their existence to the state, and which do not
derive the law of their life from the superiority of the state, but obey a high
authority within their own bosom; an authority which rules, by the grace of God,
just as the sovereignty of the State does."  (1899, p.116)
Each major sphere of society was independent, and authority within that sphere derived
from the natural order that existed within it.  
One offshoot of Kuyper's arguments was the development of South African apartheid. 
Kuyper's lectures on Calvinism were published simultaneously in Amsterdam and
Pretoria, and the concepts were adopted by those who argued for racial segregation. 
Skillen and McCarthy argue that this misrepresents Kuyper, who did not 'identify races or
nations as social spheres' (1991, p.411); but the connection between apartheid and his
emphasis on creational differences seems fairly close.  Social services under apartheid
were segregated very distinctly: there were different medical services, for example, for
whites, asians, coloureds and blacks. 
The moral repugnance which apartheid provokes tends to obscure the force of 'sphere
sovereignty' in other respects.  In the Netherlands, the main application of the principle
has been in the form of pillarisation (Bryant, 1981).  The basic structure of society was
that people lived in certain cohesive, independent networks.  The responsibilities they
had, and the responsibilities of others towards them, were determined by the kinds of
responsibility which these frameworks established.  Dutch social services were developed
on the principle of particulier initiatief: different social organisations (especially the
churches) work in distinct spheres of influence, with their own constituencies, finance
and modes of operation (Brenton, 1982).  (The word 'particulier' here has the same effect
as that of 'particularism'.)   Lijphart distinguishes separate development in the
Netherlands from apartheid on two grounds: first, that Dutch particularism is not racist,
and second, that apartheid was imposed, whereas separation in the Netherlands was
'self-imposed' (Lijphart, 1975, p.186).  This is not to deny the common ancestry of the
ideas.
'Sphere sovereignty' is vulnerable to the kind of objections which might be made from a
universalist perspective.  The central texts, by Kuyper and Dooyeweerd, are explicitly
conservative in tone; there is an underlying assumption that moral action requires
abstinence from intervention; and the concept has a disturbing association with racist
ideology.  However, the principle has other more attractive features.  The idea of
community is often valued, especially when it is associated with the recognition of a
network of responsibilities (Nisbet, 1953).  The strengths of pillarisation in practice
include the development of organisations adapted to the characteristics of different
communities, the devolution of power from the state, and the fostering and tolerance of
diverse arrangements to meet needs.  In other words, there is within the idea of sphere




The Catholic model of solidarity defines responsibilities in terms which have to be related
to the social circumstances of each person (see Coote, 1989).  The concept of solidarity
has been of particular importance in France, where the term is widely used to justify
provision, and it has been formally enshrined in social welfare law (Dupeyroux, 1989,
p.290).  The idea has become a cliché, used, like 'the welfare state' in the UK, to refer a
broad set of ideals governing the ways in which people support each other.  However,
where the 'welfare state' emphasises issues like citizenship and the right to welfare
(Marshall, 1982), solidarity depends on the place of people within social networks.  If a
person is part of such networks, there are strong mutual obligations to offer social
protection; if not, the emphasis falls on social integration, to ensure that such
relationships can be developed.
Solidarity can be understood in two main senses (Spicker, 1991).  The first describes a
network of mutual support.  People come to share, either through affiliation or through
reciprocal obligations, both duties to help others and expectations of support.  This
applies to many different kinds of network, including families, occupational groups, and
communities.  Solidaristic welfare structures are characterised, not so much by common
rights and responsibilities as by a complex network of such responsibilities.  People have
relationships with families, communities, and occupational groups; they share rights and
responsibilities mutually with others.  Much of French social policy has been concerned
with the gradual expansion of this kind of mutual network, to incorporate (or 'insert')
those left out of society - the 'marginals' (Lejeune, 1988; Alfarandi, 1989).
The second main sense of solidarity is as a form of collective social action - 'fraternity'
rather than 'mutualism'.  If people act together, it is not just because they have individual
interests in common, but because they accept a common social identity as a collective
group.  There are social preferences, and social forms of welfare - a 'common good' -
distinct from the preferences and interests of individuals.  Solidaristic measures, by this
account, are those which support and reinforce the interests of the group. 
Much of the political debate in France has focused on the question of which people
should be included within solidaristic networks.  The concept of solidarity was taken up
by a political movement, 'solidarism'.  Solidarism favoured a general extension of the
principle to the population as a whole (see Bourgeois, 1897).  It tended to assume that
solidarities would link together into a widespread, inclusive network.  However, not every
appeal to 'solidarity' would meet these criteria; there are circumstances in which
solidarities are narrowly conceived and defined.  The idea, like other forms of
particularism, has the potential to be exclusive as well as inclusive.  
Solidaristic social networks can be represented in terms similar to the 'spheres' of sphere
sovereignty, but the idea also has the potential to be interpreted within a rather more
complex framework.  Solidaristic arrangements depend on an interaction between
individuals and groups, which can overlap and be interrelated.  A person might be at the
same time a member of a family, a friendly society, and a community, and have
solidaristic relationships with each.  Social responsibility is defined in terms of
relationships like these.  The primary responsibilities are felt to those with whom one is
most intimately connected, and the strength of rights and responsibilities diminishes 
with social distance.  'One can imagine', Alfarandi suggests, 'a system of concentric circles
of solidarity, wider and wider, which goes from the nuclear family to the international
community.' (1989, p.73)
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The patterns of particularism associated with these doctrines are complex, and it may be
misleading to generalise too strongly between arguments which are themselves rooted in
different traditions and ideologies.  What the doctrines have in common is a belief that
rights and responsibilities are not general, but dependent on specific links between
people in different social contexts.  They negate universalism. 
Assessing particularism
Particularist doctrines define the boundaries of responsibility.  The moral weakness of
these beliefs is that they are, in their nature, liable to be exclusive and discriminatory. 
Particularism has encouraged separatism and racism.  However, there is a danger, in
identifying the particularist approach too closely with these kinds of problem, of losing
sight of its moral force.  Particularism can also be held to represent a process which, as
long as it is kept within appropriate bounds, is necessary and desirable.  There is not just
a distinction between in-groups and out-groups.  Social relationships form complex
networks, and responsibilities have to be defined in a specific context.  This is powerful as
a description of the way that people live in society.  It is also compelling as a moral
argument, because the obligations it emphasises are those which we are likely, in
practice, to recognise.  Values like mutual support, community, personal relationships
and loyalty are more usually prized than they are condemned.  The principal strength of
particularist doctrines is their use of such principles and relationships to reinforce their
argument.  
The existence of this kind of relationship does help to explain why certain rules are
treated as 'moral'.  Hume argued that the nature of social morality depends crucially on
its utility, and the development over time of moral codes which reflect and support social
practices (Hume, 1789, book III).  Burke, similarly, argued that the gradual process of
testing such practices led progressively to moral 'prescription', the selection of beneficial
(or functional) rules, and the rejection of undesirable ones (1790).  Morality is not, by this
account, universal; rather, it depends on the social context in which it develops.  The
central defence of the existing structure of rights and responsibilities is that without it,
there would be no real 'society' at all.  However, although this helps to explain many
moral rules, it is not enough to justify them morally: the way things are is not necessarily
the way that they should be. 
The case for universalism has to be set against these arguments.  The argument for
consistency seems fairly weak in the face of communitarian objections; it is not that the
argument is wrong, but that its scope for application is restricted.  There are still some
elements of universalism, in particular those associated with human rights, which might
be considered important as a precondition of social contact.  The provision of welfare is
often concerned with 'welfare interests', items which everyone needs, and which are in
some sense 'essential'  (Feinberg, 1973; Doyal and Gough, 1991).  Without food or water,
one cannot be a person; without basic material goods, and some (like Townsend, 1979)
would argue a great deal else besides, one cannot exist in society with others.  
This does not undermine the case for particularism; it only limits it.  When particularism is
qualified by some universal standards, Jones refers to it as 'moderate' rather than
'radical' (1990, p.39).  The kind of universalism which this permits is still limited and
defined by the context of social relationships in which it is applied.  Social duties are still
hierarchically ordered, and defined in terms both of existing networks and of social
distance.  If we pay more attention to a pensioner in Bognor than an orphan in Bogota, it
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is because we recognise the importance of such networks in shaping the patterns of
social responsibility and solidarity which define our actions.  We may draw the limits at
different stages, but virtually everyone is particularist to some extent.  Particularist
doctrines suggest that, in the way in which people relate to us, they are not equivalent;
we have special responsibilities to some people which we do not have towards others. 
The effect of the universalist argument might be to impose duties to everybody, but
these duties will not be as strong or as demanding as those which are specific to other
people.  
The welfare society
The development and strengthening of this kind of moral relationship have an important
potential for improving welfare provision.  Arguments for welfare based in reciprocity are
often stronger (as Titmuss realised) than others based in a non-specific altruism.  The
French system has developed on the basis of 'solidarity' or mutual aid (Dupeyroux, 1989). 
The kinds of networks developed in France have deficiencies, but for those who are
covered they are often notably superior to the kinds of provisions offered under the
universalist welfare state in Britain.
However, a system of solidaristic networks does not look very much like a universal
welfare state.  Universal principles, like 'social justice' or the 'right to welfare', offer basic
standards; they can also be used, in the application of rules like 'territorial justice' within
the NHS, to justify an attempt to equalise provision and resources.  By contrast,
solidaristic arrangements, in so far as they are based in relatively small, overlapping
groups, are diverse; the kinds and levels of protection which they offer depend greatly on
the context of both the person who is being helped and the group to which the need is
referred.  The main aim of mutualism is social protection: people should not have to
suffer destructive changes in their lives because of needs like sickness, unemployment or
old age.  This often implies unequal treatment - because a person in a better position has
further to fall than a poor person.
The 'institutional model' of welfare has similar concerns - the development of systems to
protect people against socially defined needs.  If this is what the 'welfare state' is like, it
does not have to be seen as monolithic (Titmuss, 1974) or even egalitarian (Spicker, 1988,
pp 159-161).  However, the model associated with this argument is not so much the
traditional 'welfare state' as what Titmuss and Robson called a 'welfare society' (Titmuss,
1968, ch 11; Robson, 1976).  For many, this is now associated with a concept of welfare
pluralism.  An important element within the discussion, though, has been a critique of the
universalist pretensions of the welfare state; the welfare state cannot do everything.  The
welfare society is one in which people recognise responsibilities towards each other,
through a system of 'gift-reciprocity' which binds together the various actors in society.  
The development of the concept of a welfare society has depended on a picture of a
diverse, multifaceted set of social relationships - including the kinds of relationships
considered in sphere sovereignty.  The arguments for independent provision include the
belief that diversity complements existing provision, fosters innovation, increases
flexibility and choice, and offers alternative perspectives from state welfare.  For those
(on both right and left) who think that state welfare can be restrictive and repressive, the
devolution and decentralisation of welfare can be seen as a means of empowering
people.
Page 9
This argument is not necessarily particularist, but it is very likely to be.  The emphasis on
diversity is difficult to reconcile with the norms usually associated with universal
principles of distribution, like minimum guarantees or optimal provision.  It can be argued
that there are different routes to achieving basic standards; and if there are different
routes, one has to ask on what basis they can be judged.  There are some answers which
might be compatible with universalism: that the standard to be achieved must depend on
the choices of the people being served; or that the best location for decisions is at the
level where they will apply (a principle also, incidentally, compatible with sphere
sovereignty).  But there are also answers that are particularist: that the standards cannot
be seen in the abstract, but have to be translated into a form which is compatible with
the social context in which they are applied; that although basic standards are desirable,
it is for every moral community to decide how, and whether, to pursue them; and, of
course, that different standards should apply to different people.
The limits of particularism
Particularism and communitarianism present an important challenge for socialists.  The
arguments are framed in terms very similar to those which socialists themselves use,
referring to social networks, mutual aid and collective action.  These are ideas which
socialists are likely to approve of.  At the same time, some aspects of particularism are
repellent; the idea can be used to justify racism, inequality, patronage and injustice.  My
own position is ambivalent, as might by now be clear; I am both attracted and appalled
by the concepts.  The problem is to find some way of taking on board what is valuable in
the particularist approach without conceding its disagreeable points.
Jones takes the view that it is at least possible to reconcile particularism with some
universal values:  
"strictly, there is no reason why moderate particularism should not also
accommodate an idea of universal rights of citizenship - if by that we mean only
that there are certain rights which every political community must accord to its
members."  (1990, p.40)
This is probably right, though there are some reservations to make about it.  Universal
rights have to be interpreted and realised within a social context, which means that they
are subject to particular applications.  Particularism is necessary, and perhaps even
desirable, to the extent that it provides the means through which people are able to
exercise rights and duties, and by which they participate in society.  It ceases to be
defensible in cases where it contradicts other kinds of moral principle, like the right to
welfare.  This is an important limitation, but it still implies a significant qualification to 
universalism - that some degree of particularism, and so of discrimination between
groups, is desirable.  The main issue is to decide where the boundaries lie.
The weakness of moderate particularism is that it assumes the status quo to be desirable
unless some argument can be made to the contrary.  This is the basis for many of the
arguments which are actually made.  For example, people commonly use the rules of
inheritance and succession to offer property, some protection and where possible some
advantages to others.  This is largely defensible in terms of the social framework which I
have been describing.  The main reservation to make is that the result of such rules may
not be socially just; the position after succession has to be reviewed and if necessary
altered to prevent unacceptable inequalities from arising.  However, there are also cases
in which the assumption seems unwarranted.  Particularism is an argument for
discrimination, and there are wholly unacceptable grounds for discrimination.  In cases
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where a landlord will not accept a tenant on the grounds of race, or where politicians
appoint unqualified members of their families to public office, it is not generally the
practice to say that 'this would be reasonable were it not for some other values which it
contradicts'.  On the contrary, they are unreasonable, and there is something wrong with
a principle which states otherwise. 
It is not enough, then, to try to reconcile contradictory values.  What needs to be done is
to find a different way of appealing to values like 'community' and 'solidarity' which does
not leave room for exclusion and injustice.  There have been a number of attempts to do
so.  The idea of community is ambiguous; it can refer, amongst many other definitions, to
a network of social relationships, a geographical area, or a group of people with common
interests.  To make the emphasis on community as inclusive as possible, the idea has to
be taken in a fairly comprehensive sense.  It might, for example, be taken to mean a
geographical area - so that everyone within that area makes up part of the 'community' -
or to a widely spread group of people, defined in terms of their common rights or
citizenship.  David Miller argues that the idea of community can effectively be identified
with the nation state (1990, ch 9); others, like Ruth Lister, try to define 'citizenship' as
widely as possible (1990).  The solidaristic approach equally depends on establishing the
broadest possible terms for the inclusion of people at the margins.  The issue is implicit
within Titmuss's understanding of 'gift-reciprocity' (1970); a more fully elaborated
example is Bill Jordan's 'socialist model' of welfare (1987, p.42).  It is possible to represent
all these arguments in terms of 'moderate particularism', which would suggest that there
is some inconsistency in the positions they hold.  I think, though, that the case which
communitarian socialists wish to make can be argued without any theoretical
inconsistency.  
People's lives develop within a particular social context, and that they are structured in
terms of that context.  This is the central case for the development of 'particular' rights
and responsibilities.   Social relationships, and social networks, are the means through
which people are able to make a reality of their hopes or aspirations.  The view which this
represents is a form of freedom, in a 'positive' sense - the freedom to do things.  More
importantly, it is freedom in a collective sense.  People can only be said to be 'free' or
'unfree', not when they act in isolation from others, but when their actions are seen in
relation to others (Spicker, 1985).  In order to be free, people must be able to choose;
they must have the power to choose; and they must not be prevented from choosing.  In
principle, freedom can be increased without diminishing the freedom of others; people
collaborating, for example, can all increase their range of actions.  In a social context,
however, people's freedom tends to be limited by the structure of power: in these
circumstances, the power to act can be increased only through a relative increase in their
power, and a reduction in the power of others.  
Another way of saying this is that there must be a redistribution of power. The idea of
'empowerment' means that people who are relatively powerless are able to gain more
power.  The term has only recently come into widespread use, and it tends to reflect its
origins in social work practice.  Solomon, in the earliest use I have been able to identify,
defines empowerment as
"a process whereby the social worker or other helping professional engages in a
set of activities with the client aimed at reducing the powerlessness stemming
from the experience of discrimination because the client belongs to a stigmatised
collective"  (Solomon, 1976 p.29);
this has subsequently been extended to refer to 
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"the mechanism by which people, organisations and communities gain mastery
over their lives"  (Rappaport 1984, cited Holdsworth 1991 p.3).
A protest against the closure of a local school or hospital is almost invariably made in
competition with the allocation of resources elsewhere.  Positive action for racial groups,
such as black housing associations, always runs the risk that in compensating for the
disadvantages for one group it may work to the detriment of others.  Empowerment has
to be taken, then, as a relative concept.  The test which has to be applied is a relative
one: what is the balance of power, and to what extent does it produce disadvantage?   
Increasing people's freedom, and reducing their disadvantage, are general principles,
even if they can only be understood in a social context; they apply to everyone.  If
principles like 'community' and 'solidarity' are advocated as a means to empowerment
and the removal of disadvantage, there does not have to be any inconsistency.  But this
means that they must be treated as secondary rather than primary values; universal
claims like freedom and equality have priority.  It is only when socialists advocate
'community' and 'solidarity' as values in their own right that they come close to a
particularism which can undermine universal claims for equality and social justice.  There
are dangers, but the theoretical problems can be resolved.
There are still important practical problems.  Communitarian values have to be applied
within a particular social framework.  It is often assumed that if people who are most
vulnerable and most often excluded are given power, they will ensure that others like
them who have been excluded will be given greater opportunities.  The reverse may well
be the case.  Tenants in poor estates do their utmost to keep out 'problem families';
parents of children in schools where many children do not speak English (notably in the
Dewsbury case) have tried to take their children out.  This may be distasteful, but there is
nothing surprising in it.  Empowerment means that people are gaining power in a
competition for scarce resources.  It means that they will have the opportunity, as others
have, to protect their own situation, and those they care about.  They are being given the
opportunity to participate - to take part in social relationships and networks.  People are
being empowered to do the kinds of thing which other people do; and the kinds of thing
which other people do are often discriminatory.  The real dilemma for communitarian
socialism rests not, then, in the need to reconcile universalism with particularism in
theory, but in the problem of respecting universal values in practice.  
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